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‘You can’t have one without the other’ 
The differential impact of civil society strength on the 
implementation of EU policy 
 
Reini Schrama and Asya Zhelyazkova 
 
ABSTRACT: The importance of civil society in policymaking is twofold; 
CSOs monitor government performance and mediate between citizens and the 
state to ensure proper implementation. In this study, we analyze the effects of 
two aspects of civil society (civic participation and CSO consultation) on 
member states’ implementation of EU policy. The analysis is based on a novel 
dataset of practical implementation in 24 member states. Our findings reveal 
that the combination of high levels of civic participation and routine CSO 
consultations improves policy implementation. Furthermore, the effect is 
conditional on states’ bureaucratic capacity to accommodate societal interests 
regarding the EU directives. The results indicate a paradox; civil society is not 
effective in countries with low bureaucratic capacity, where civil society is 
needed most to improve government performance. 
 
KEY WORDS: Civic Participation; Civil Society; EU policy; Interest 
Intermediation; Policy Implementation 
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Introduction 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are often credited for increasing public 
accountability and improving governance outputs. A vibrant civil society can 
increase transparency of policymaking and hold governments accountable to 
implement policies accordingly. Furthermore, CSOs cooperate with policy-
makers by communicating societal interest and creating a broad policy support 
base. However, the strength of civil society varies widely across countries. Many 
studies have reported low levels of societal engagement in the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Howard 2003). Conversely, 
other scholars have argued that low levels of civic participation are 
compensated by activism aimed at connecting with political actors (Petrova and 
Tarrow 2006; Foa and Ekiert 2016). 
Nevertheless, we lack understanding of the relationship between different 
aspects of civil society strength and policy implementation by administrative 
actors across countries and policy areas. Policy implementation is especially 
relevant for CSOs’ success in translating societal interests into outcomes, as 
policies become effective when they are enforced by the relevant public 
institutions.  
In this study, we analyse the impact of civil society strength on policy 
implementation by focusing on citizens’ participation in voluntary 
organizations (based on the “logic of membership”) and CSOs’ opportunities to 
influence policymaking through consultations (based on the “logic of 
influence”) (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). Furthermore, we expect that the 
effect of civil society is conditional on the bureaucratic capacities of public 
institutions and societal support for public policy. Thus, we contribute to the 
literature on civil society by theoretically and empirically distinguishing 
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between two different aspects of civil society strength and the conditions under 
which they affect policy outcomes. 
Moreover, the empirical analysis focuses on the implementation of European 
Union (EU) policies by national administrative actors. Because each member 
state must implement policies in accordance with common EU requirements, 
we can compare the impact of civil society strength on implementation 
performance across countries and policy areas.  
To test our hypotheses, we rely on a novel dataset on legislative and practical 
implementation across 24 countries and four policy areas (Internal Market, 
Environment, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Social Policy). Our findings 
show that civic participation and CSO consultation are like “horse and 
carriage”: for a positive impact on policy implementation, one cannot go 
without the other. Hence, the implementation of EU policies does benefit from 
a vibrant civil society, but only if CSOs are included in the policymaking 
process. However, the results also indicate a paradox; the two aspects of civil 
society strength do not affect implementation in countries with low 
bureaucratic capacities, where civil society is most needed to improve 
government performance. Finally, public support for EU policy-making 
moderates the relationship between civic participation and the implementation 
of EU social policy. 
 
Civil society strength 
Since its revival in the last couple of decades, civil society has featured in many 
different strands of literature focusing on democracy, norm diffusion and 
policy-making. These studies ascribe different roles to civil society that have 
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consequences for conceptualizing its strength. According to social capital 
scholars, civil society is an intermediary structure that provides opportunities 
for citizens to mobilize in collective action (Wollebæk and Selle 2007). Based 
on this perspective, civil society strength is conceptualized as CSOs’ ability to 
mobilize members to engage in civic action. In a similar vein, Schmitter and 
Streeck (1999) contend that CSOs function based on “the logic of membership”, 
when they rely on a large member base to legitimize civic causes and make their 
voice heard.  
Civil society strength can also be conceptualized based on the “logic of 
influence” (Schmitter and Streeck 1999), whereby CSOs cooperate with state 
actors to influence policies. CSOs aggregate the interests of citizens and act as 
mediators in state-society relations by communicating societal preferences to 
policy-makers (Treib et al. 2007). For example, Hadenius and Uggla (1996) 
underline that CSOs need to cooperate with governments in order to effectively 
further democratic reforms in countries undergoing transition to democracy. 
The influence of civil society on policy reforms then depends on the opportunity 
structures provided by the state (Della Porta 20o9, Kriesi et al. 1992). For 
example, states can empower CSOs by providing them public recognition and 
access to policy-making through consultation mechanisms. Alternatively, states 
may deny CSOs opportunities to voice societal interests during the policy-
making process, making the implementation phase vulnerable to disruptive 
protests.  
Moreover, civil society strength depends on the resources available to CSOs 
(money and expertise) to take advantage of political opportunities.  Studies on 
interest groups (including CSOs), have shown that organizational resources 
facilitate CSO access to political institutions (Mahony and Baumgartner 2008). 
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Finally, there is a large literature on transnational civil society focusing on the 
links between domestic CSOs and their international counterparts. In this view, 
transnational networks empower national CSOs by providing expertise and 
resources (Schofer and Longhofer 2011; Andonova and Tuta, 2014).  
In this study, we define CSOs as all domestic organizations in the sphere 
between economy and state, composed of self-organizing citizens in pursuit of 
a common civic goal (Coppedge et al. 2017).3 Furthermore, we focus on the role 
of domestic organized civil society in the implementation of EU directives. 
Because EU directives set policy requirements that have to be followed by all 
member states, they enable us to compare implementation performance across 
countries and issue areas. 
 
Civil society and EU policy implementation 
Studies of European Union politics have acknowledged the role of civil society 
in EU governance (see Heidbreder, 2012 for an overview of the literature) and 
policy implementation in particular (e.g., Börzel, 2010; Börzel and Buzogany, 
2010). Theoretically, there are two major approaches that explain why 
governments fail to implement EU policies: enforcement and management 
(Tallberg 2002). Whereas enforcement approaches focus on the preferences of 
implementing and non-state actors, management scholars emphasize that 
implementation problems often emerge from capacity limitations. The role of 
civil society in implementation is rooted in both enforcement and management 
explanations. According to enforcement ideas, civil society involvement in 
                                                        
3 This includes voluntary associations, interest groups, trade unions, social movements, NGOs and 
professional associations. 
 6 
policy-making increases societal acceptance of policy outputs, even if societal 
interests haven’t been fully accommodated (Börzel 2010). In addition, civil 
society monitors the implementation process and raises complaints against 
breaches of EU law. Based on the management logic, however, some studies 
argue that government cooperation with CSOs could also inhibit the capacity of 
governments to resolve implementation problems by increasing the number of 
veto players capable of disrupting implementation (Jensen 2007). 
Empirically, most studies on the relation between civil society and 
implementation have focused on post-communist countries (Sedelmeier 
2008). This research shows that differences between the strength of civil society 
in Western and Eastern Europe persist after enlargement (Sissenich, 2010). 
The EU had an unequal impact on civil society by empowering non-state actors 
with already existing capacities and willingness to cooperate with the state 
(Börzel, 2010; Börzel and Buzogany, 2010). Other studies, however, paint a 
more nuanced picture of CSO’s role in policy implementation. Despite trends 
of weak civic participation, CSOs in the region have developed both enduring 
and temporary ties with government and bureaucratic institutions (Petrova and 
Tarrow 2006; Foa and Ekiert 2016). Even in societies with both weak state 
capacities and civic participation, CSOs are able to exert influence on 
government activities through naming and shaming (Dimitrova and Buzogany, 
2014). 
The strength of civil society also varies within Western EU member states. For 
example, Saurugger (2007) reports that the French government is generally 
unwilling to discuss matters or negotiate with civil society groups. Other 
countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands are believed to encourage 
communications with citizens’ and organized civil society. 
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Because most studies focus on a small sample of countries in a single policy 
area, we lack systematic research on the impact of civil society strength on 
implementation in the EU member states across different issue areas. 
Therefore, we analyze two aspects of civil society strength: citizens’ 
participation in voluntary organizations and government consultations with 
CSOs during policy-making. First, while these aspects do not account for 
variation in the expertise and material resources in different CSOs within 
member states and policy areas, they enable us to study the relevance of civil 
society on policy implementation more generally in a cross-national 
framework. Second, these dimensions are also theoretically inspired by two 
different logics of civil society strength: the logic of membership and the logic 
of influence (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). 
 
Theorizing the role of civil society in policy implementation  
Logics of membership and influence 
The defining characteristics of civil society strength are captured by “the logic 
of membership” and “the logic of influence” (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). As 
discussed earlier, based on the logic of membership, civil society strength 
depends on its ability to mobilize a large support base for civic causes. Larger 
membership helps CSOs legitimize the relevance of their causes and extract 
resources for public campaigns. Instead, according to the logic of influence, civil 
society strength depends on access to political institutions and ability to shape 
policy outcomes through cooperation with government.  
Both logics play a role in the implementation of public policy. Based on the 
membership logic, CSOs enjoying large and active membership are better able 
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to understand societal grievances and communicate these to the relevant 
political institutions. When provided access to the policy process, CSOs can rely 
on the support of volunteers, mobilize collective action, and extract resources 
from their members to facilitate implementation (Stark et al. 2006). Based on 
the logic of influence, policy implementation depends on the coordination 
mechanisms between CSOs and political institutions. Establishing routine 
consultations with non-state actors allows for stable intermediation between 
CSOs and the state. To influence public policy, CSOs share expertise with 
governments about societal interests and the most effective implementation 
strategies. CSO involvement in the policy process, thus, helps policy-makers 
understand the impact of their decisions on the citizens they target and take 
decisions that reflect the EU policy requirements (Rose-Ackerman 2005). For 
example, Putnam et al. (1994) demonstrated that reforms are most effectively 
carried when they are a joint effort by CSOs and the state. In short, we expect 
that both civic participation and CSO involvement in consultation positively 
affect policy implementation.  
 
H1a: Higher levels of civic participation (logic of membership) positively affect 
policy implementation. 
H1b:  Government routine consultations with CSOs (logic of influence) 
positively affect policy implementation. 
 
Existing research on interest groups and CSOs also acknowledge that there is a 
relationship between the logics. In particular, consultation practices have 
pushed CSOs to become more professional and as a result lose their 
representativeness (Saurugger 2006). In other words, it is assumed that groups 
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put the majority of their time and resources into „logic of influence‟ activities 
at the cost of „logic of membership‟ (cf Schmitter and Streeck 1999). 
On the other hand, the literature also suggests organizations try to balance 
both logics in order to gain access to policy-makers, while at the same time 
being member-responsive (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). Thus, consultation 
processes are more likely to be successful when CSOs are able to mobilize public 
support. CSOs can use their member base to gain awareness of societal 
grievances and provide more complete and informed advice to governments 
regarding the impact of public policies on the citizens they target. At the same 
time, the impact of civic participation (logic of membership) on policy 
implementation also depends on whether CSOs are involved in the policy-
making process (logic of influence). The exclusion of CSOs from the policy 
process could lead to policies that lack support, because citizens are not able to 
communicate their interests to the state (Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Börzel, 
2010). Under these circumstances, civic participation could cause societal 
discontent against public policies (Verba et al. 1995; Rose-Ackerman 2005). 
Consequently, even if some organizations may trade less civic participation for 
more influence, studies employing the logics contend that organizations need 
to combine both logics to be successful in influencing public policy (Schmitter 
and Streeck 1999; Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2009). Thus, we expect that higher 
levels of civic participation combined with routine consultations with CSO is 
positively associated with practical implementation. 
 
H1c: The combination of higher levels of civic participation (logic of 
membership) and routine consultation with CSOs (logic of influence) positively 
affects policy implementation. 
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Scope conditions: State capacity and societal preferences 
The impact of civil society strength is likely to depend on state bureaucratic 
capacities and the preferences of citizens in relation to the adopted policies.  
Although CSOs can help improve implementation by communicating potential 
problems and societal interests, the implementation of EU policies is the 
responsibility of administrative actors in the member states. Therefore, when 
administrative capacity is low, civil society strength is expected to have limited 
impact on policy implementation (Börzel, 2010; Sissenich, 2010). Rather, both 
state and society benefit from each other’s strength (Hadenius and Uggla 1996). 
While the state is dependent on the linkages between society and policy-makers 
to increase implementation performance, CSOs gain influence through their 
engagement with the state (Sissenich 2010).  
 As argued by Tilly (2004), institutionalized state-society relations, such as 
consultation practices, are instrumental for advanced democracies, but they 
also increase societal pressure on governments to be responsive through 
effective bureaucracy. According to the seminal study by Almond and Verba 
(1963), a political system should have the capacity to cope with intense societal 
demands through civic participation. More effective bureaucratic institutions 
are better able to incorporate societal demands and the external requirements 
of the EU and thereby reinforce the positive effect civil society strength on 
policy implementation. If governments do not have the capacity to incorporate 
the interests in the consultation process and meet the EU requirements, this 
may even raise public discontent (Verba et al. 1995) and lead to non-compliance 
with EU policy. Accordingly, we expect that the effect of civil society on policy 
outcomes varies across countries with different levels of administrative 
capacity. 
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H2: The impact of civil society strength (CSO consultation and civic 
participation) on policy implementation is stronger in high-capacity countries. 
 
Although most literature focused on the facilitating role of CSOs in improving 
EU policy implementation (Dai 2005), some studies have acknowledged the 
potential for negative effects as well. In his study on member states’ ability to 
implement EU labour market policy, Jensen (2007) argues that societal actors 
opposed to EU policy can act as veto players and obstruct the implementation 
process. Conceptualized as societal veto players, CSOs are different from the 
institutional or party-political veto players, as they do not gain veto rights from 
their formal position (Bauer et al. 2004). Instead, their role as veto players is 
determined by the ability to mobilize constituents to block the implementation 
of unfavourable policies. In particular, CSOs can mobilize against 
implementation when policies enjoy limited or no support by citizens. The less 
societal support policies enjoy, the stronger the incentives of CSOs to hamper 
implementation. Thus, if societal preferences are not in line with a particular 
EU policy, CSOs representing public interest are likely to mobilize against its 
implementation in the domestic context, deteriorating member states’ 
compliance with EU law.  
 
H3: The impact of civil society strength on EU policy implementation is 
weaker (and even negative) when societal support for EU policy is low. 
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Research design 
Data and measurement of practical implementation 
To test our hypotheses on practical implementation, we rely on a novel dataset 
on policy implementation across different member states and EU policy areas 
that was collected by Zhelyazkova et al. (2016). The dataset is based on external 
evaluation reports about national implementation of EU policies that were 
prepared by various consultancies contracted by the EU Commission. The 
criteria for data collection have been described by Zhelyazkova et al. (2016) and 
are not discussed here due to space limitations. However, the main advantage 
of the data-set is that it provides separate measures for legal implementation 
related to the content of national rules and for practical implementation 
capturing administrative activities across 24 EU member states. 4  This is 
important for the purposes of the study, because the theoretical arguments 
relate to practical implementation of EU policies rather than the legal 
framework adopted by governments. Furthermore, the dataset covers EU 
directives from four policy areas: Internal Market, JHA, Environment and 
Social Policy 5 . Despite the limited number of policy sectors, the selection 
captures distinct civil societal groupings within the member states (e.g., 
industry, environment, humanitarian international organizations, minority 
and women rights groups) which enables deriving more general conclusions 
about the effects of civic participation and CSO consultation on policy 
implementation. 
                                                        
4 The data-set does not include information about Croatia. We excluded Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta 
due to missing data on several independent variables. 
5 Zhelyazkova et al. (2016) provide further information about the selection of policy areas. 
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The final dataset contains information about both legal and practical 
implementation for 24 directives (three Internal Market, three Environment, 
four Social Policy, and fourteen JHA directives). Previous studies did not find 
evidence that the considerably higher number of JHA directives is problematic. 
Nevertheless, we control for policy-area differences to account for the 
unbalanced number of directives within sectors.  
The evaluation reports provide information about member states’ 
implementation performance regarding separate provisions in a directive. 
Relevant provisions refer to articles or sub-articles that address separate EU 
requirements within directives that require national implementation. For 
example, some provisions require the establishment of particular institutional 
arrangements to ensure effective enforcement equality bodies in member 
states, while others demand effective information dissemination on visa 
resident procedures. Practical implementation with EU directives is measured 
as the share of correctly implemented provisions by each member state relative 
to all relevant provisions in a directive (as assessed by the country experts). The 
dependent variable ranges between 0 (none of the EU requirements in a 
directive were implemented by the relevant domestic actors) to 1 (all of the EU 
requirements were implemented). 
 
Measuring civil society strength, state capacity and societal 
support for EU policies 
Civil society is a multi-dimensional concept that requires considering multiple 
indicators from different data sources to measure its strength (Heinrich 2005). 
At the same time, the need for comparative research entails constraining the 
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analytical focus to civil society characteristics that could be analysed in a cross-
country and cross-issue framework. Following our theoretical arguments, we 
focus on two aspects of CSO strength: levels of civic participation and the extent 
to which CSOs are engaged in the policymaking process (CSO consultation). 
Although various comparative projects consider both the capacity of citizens to 
engage in civil society and the infrastructure that facilitates CSOs, most datasets 
either lack variation across years (e.g., Civicus Civil Society Enabling 
Environment Index), do not cover all EU member states (e.g., CNP Global 
Society Index) or do not allow for a comparison across indicators (e.g., USAID 
Civil Society Organizational Index).  Instead, we rely on two separate data 
sources that provide variation across time, cover all EU member states and 
differentiate between policy areas (for civic participation). 
Civic participation is measured by the percentage of respondents in 
Eurobarometer surveys that indicated they actively participate or volunteer as 
a member in specific voluntary organizations. The survey question was asked 
in 2004, 2006 and 2011 6  and the respondents could select the type of 
organization from a number of alternatives. We only considered participation 
in organizations that are relevant for the policy areas in our dataset. EU policies 
in the area of environment set minimum standards for the protection of the 
environment through targets for emission ceilings and recycling of packaging 
and vehicles. Internal Market directives set EU requirements for consumer 
protection by improving the quality of services and transparency procedures for 
companies. The implementation of JHA policies aims to protect the human 
rights of asylum seekers and third-country nationals. Finally, EU requirements 
                                                        
6 Data was taken from Eurobarometer 62.2 (2004), 66.3  (2006)and 76.2 (2011), and merged with the 
same or closest years when practical implementation was recorded. 
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regarding Social Policy set minimum standards on the equal treatment of 
women and men and the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, 
religion, sexual orientation, age and disability. The list of relevant organizations 
includes: “an organization for protection of the environment” (Environment), 
consumer organizations (Internal Market), an international organization: 
human rights (JHA). In the case of Social Policy, we measure participatory 
activity in organizations for the defence of the rights of minorities and interest 
groups for specific causes (such as sexual orientation or women’s issues).  
Second, to obtain information about CSO consultation we rely on data from 
the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2017). The project defines broadly civil 
society as the “organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state and 
private life” and is “composed of voluntary associations of people joined 
together in common purpose” (V-Dem project, pp. 400). It excludes public and 
private economic firms. Country experts identified whether major CSOs were 
routinely consulted by policy-makers on issues relevant to their members. 
Based on expert assessments, governments were considered insulated from 
CSO input (coded as 0), CSOs were considered as but one set of voices policy-
makers take into account (coded as 1) or relevant CSOs were recognized as 
stakeholders and given a voice on important policy areas (coded as 2).  
State capacity is measured based on data from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators Database (2016). We employ the “Government Effectiveness” 
indicator, which ranges between -2.5 and 2.5 and is the most widely used 
aggregate measure for bureaucratic state capacity. The indicator combines 
societal perception and expert assessments about the quality of public and civil 
services measured on yearly basis.  
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We measure citizens’ preferences towards EU policy based on information 
from the Eurobarometer survey. Societal preferences towards specific 
supranational policies is captured by the percentage of Eurobarometer 
respondents (averaged for all years) who believe that a given policy area should 
be decided at the EU level.7 Thus, we measure general societal support for EU 
policies rather than the policy-specific preferences of CSOs involved in the 
implementation process. Nevertheless, this variable captures the extent to 
which citizens participating in voluntary organizations (civic participation) are 
likely to support or reject specific EU policies.   
 
Control variables 
In addition to the main independent variables, we control for several country 
and policy characteristics that could affect our findings. For example, civil 
society is generally considered to be weaker in the new EU member states from 
CEE than the EU-15 member states from Western Europe (Sedelmeier 2008) 
(Western state = 1). Furthermore, the willingness of governments to 
accommodate CSOs’ input during the implementation process could depend on 
the policy-makers’ preferences towards supranational policies. The expert 
reports also provide unique information about the relevant ministers involved 
in the implementation process for a given directive. Information about political 
actors’ positions regarding different policy sectors was obtained from the 
Chapel Hill surveys (Bakker et al. 2015). Moreover, state capacity to implement 
the EU policies also depends on the number of institutional veto players 
                                                        
7The variable combines information from the following Eurobarometer items and surveys: environment 
protection (1996-2010); immigration policy (1996-2010); competition policy (2005-2010); human 
rights protection (1999) and men/women equality (2009). 
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responsible for policy implementation (measured as the number of ministries 
involved in the implementation process).  
The quality of national legislation with regard to supranational policy is also 
likely to be a strong predictor for practical implementation. In particular, some 
countries may have high standards enshrined in their national legislation. 
Consequently, CSOs can contribute little to improve the implementation 
process, as national bureaucrats could simply follow established national rules. 
The measure for legal compliance follows the same logic as the 
operationalization of the dependent variable and captures the share of legally 
compliant EU provisions relative to all evaluated provisions within a directive.  
At the policy level, we acknowledge that the effects of civic participation and 
consultation on practical implementation vary across policy areas. We also 
control for the degree of leeway (discretion) that EU directives grant member 
states during implementation (measured as the share of “may” provisions 
relative to all directive provisions). 
Finally, differences in the evaluation reports may bias the validity of the 
estimates. Thus, we control for the structure (reports structured based on 
specific rules or specific countries), length (number of pages allotted to a 
particular country) and timing of the reports (number of days between the 
implementation deadline and the publication of the first report).  
 
Results 
Descriptive analysis 
Before testing the effects of civic participation and consultation on the practical 
implementation of EU policies, we analyse the distribution of the two 
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components of civil society strength across countries and policy areas.  
First, civic participation based on the Eurobarometer surveys (2004 – 2011) 
is most pronounced in associations related to the protection of women and 
minority rights (Social policy; median level = 2.1) and it is lowest in 
international and human rights organizations (JHA; median = 0.8) (Figure 1, 
left) 8. One possible explanation is that human rights organizations depend 
more on donors and supporters signing petitions to further their causes, rather 
than voluntary membership by citizens. Second, there is a clear divide between 
western and CEE member states in levels of civic participation (Figure 1, right). 
All CEE member states have lower rates of civic participation than Western 
member states. This is in line with earlier studies that report a lack of societal 
engagement in voluntary organizations as an indicator for a weak civil society 
in this region (Howard, 2003; Sissenich, 2010). With the exception of 
Lithuania, less than 1% of the respondents from the CEE member states 
reported participation activities in the selected CSO categories. On average, 
civic participation is highest in Sweden (4.7%), followed by Italy (4.0%) and 
Denmark (3.8%). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Member-state patterns of CSO consultation paint a more mixed picture. In 
line with findings by Petrova and Tarrow (2006) and Foa and Ekiert (2016), 
civil society in CEE member states is not systematically weaker than in their 
                                                        
8 Considering a number of observations fall outside the range of observations in Environment, Internal 
Market and JHA, we employed robustness checks, which showed that the potential mild and extreme 
outliers did not significantly change the results. 
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Western counterparts, once other dimensions of civil society strength are 
considered. Moreover, the two civil society dimensions are not correlated. 
Whereas CSOs in Sweden can rely on a relatively high number of volunteers, 
their engagement in the policymaking process through consultation is limited. 
In contrast, the Polish government routinely engages in consultations with 
CSOs, but very few citizens participate in the selected voluntary organizations. 
 
Explanatory analysis 
Table 1 presents the results on the effects of civic participation and CSO 
consultation on the implementation performance of member states regarding 
24 EU directives from four different policy areas. Because practical 
implementation is bounded between 0 and 1, we employ fractional logit 
analysis9 to test our hypotheses. Table 1 reports the effects of civic participation 
and consultation separately (Model 1) as well as the interaction between the two 
aspects of civil society strength (Models 2). Models 3 and 4 present the results 
from the analysis of the impact of civil society strength on practical 
implementation in low- (Model 3) and high-capacity countries (Model 4). We 
also test the moderating effect of societal preferences on the relation between 
civil society strength and practical implementation by including the interaction 
between societal preferences and civic participation in Model 5. Arguably, 
societal preferences influence citizens’ incentives to mobilize against policy 
implementation. Therefore, we assume that civic participation, as an aspect of 
                                                        
9 We also employed a multilevel mixed-effect model to account for the nested structure of the data. Since 
only the directive-level random effects had a significant effect, we only cluster in directives. The 
supplementary appendix presents the models with standard errors clustered in member states. 
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civil society strength, is more conducive to changes in societal preferences than 
CSO involvement in policy-making.  
The results in Table 1 provide notable insights about the relationship 
between civic participation, state-society cooperation and member states’ 
implementation performance. In particular, high rates of participation in 
voluntary organizations (logic of membership) and frequent access to national 
government (logic of influence) alone have no significant impact on state 
implementation performance (Model 1) Whereas frequent CSO consultation 
could improve government knowledge about gaps in implementation, the 
amount of consultation does not lead to better implementation. One possible 
explanation is that CSOs could act as veto players in the implementation 
process (Jensen, 2007).  
 
Table 1 here 
 
However, high levels of civic participation coupled with frequent CSO 
involvement in government consultations increase the level of practical 
implementation of EU directives (Model 2). Our findings portray a complex 
relationship between civic participation and government consultation practices 
with CSOs. With regard to the main explanatory variables and their interactive 
effect, we cannot interpret these directly (see Brambor et al. 2006). Instead, 
Figure 2 presents a three-dimensional illustration of the interactive 
relationship between civic participation and CSO consultation. When civic 
participation is limited, the predicted effect of CSO involvement in government 
consultations on practical implementation is negative. Thus, CSO consultation 
decreases the quality of practical implementation, in countries and issue areas 
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with no civic participation. One possible explanation is that lack of civic 
participation may decrease CSO awareness about societal concerns and, hence, 
their ability to effectively convey potential implementation problems during the 
consultation process.  
Similarly, we observe a significant negative effect of civic participation on 
practical implementation for scenarios where national governments never 
consult with the relevant CSOs (CSO consultation = 0). In instances where 
CSOs are excluded from government policy-making, higher civic participation 
obstructs the implementation process (as illustrated by the increasingly 
negative effect of civic participation). The predicted effect of civil society 
strength turns positive only when at least 5% of Eurobarometer respondents 
indicated voluntary participation in any of the selected policy areas. Conversely, 
the significant positive interaction effect supports our theoretical argument 
that high civic participation coupled with frequent interactions with 
government improves member state’s implementation performance with 
regard to EU directives. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Whereas we find general support for H1c, the impact of civil society is likely 
to vary across countries with different state capacities (H2) and EU societal 
preferences (H3). To test H2, we replicated the analysis for low- and high-
capacity countries separately in Models 3 and 4 respectively. A state is 
considered to have high administrative capacities to implement public policy, 
if it scores higher than 0.90. While the threshold may appear arbitrary, the 
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choice ensures that both CEE and Western member states are represented in 
the two capacity categories.10  
As expected, civil society strength does not have a significant effect on 
practical implementation in low-capacity states (Model 3). The picture is 
different for high-capacity countries (Model 4), where the impact of engaged 
citizens and routine CSO consultations strongly resembles the findings in 
Model 2 of Table 1. In short, the analysis suggests that differences in civic 
participation and CSO consultation significantly affect the implementation 
process in high-capacity countries only. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Finally, the observed negative impact of civic participation may be due to low 
societal support towards EU policies (H3). However, societal support does not 
significantly affect the relationship between civic participation and practical 
implementation (Model 5). Because societal preferences may be more relevant 
for some policy areas than others, we further explored the interaction between 
societal support and civic participation across different policy areas (see Figure 
3). The analysis shows that the effect of civic participation on practical 
implementation is conditional on societal EU support only in Social Policy and 
Environment directives. Furthermore, whereas high EU policy-specific societal 
support strengthens the effect of civic participation on the practical 
implementation of EU Social Policy, high societal support seems to impede the 
                                                        
10 Setting higher thresholds for government effectiveness resulted in models where state capacity was 
collinear with post-communist legacies. We should note that we replicated the analysis, using different 
thresholds for low and high capacity. The results remain essentially the same and are reported in the 
supplementary appendix. 
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effectiveness of civic action in Environment. However, the latter effect 
disappears if we control for national legislation in relation to EU environmental 
policy. One possible explanation concerns the nature of civic actions regarding 
Environment policies. Citizens often participate in environmental associations 
because they are dissatisfied with the way governments handle environmental 
problems. Environmentally-engaged citizens also realize that problems related 
to curbing emissions or waste management require global policy and are 
consequently generally supportive of supranational directives. 
 In line with our expectations, civic participation has a positive effect on 
practical implementation when EU citizens are supportive of supranational 
policy concerning anti-discrimination and gender equality directives. EU social 
policy directives generally incur high adoption costs on governments (e.g., 
facilities for accommodating disabled persons at the work place) and require 
changes in long-standing employment structures. In such situations, high level 
of societal support coupled with strong civic participation exerts pressure on 
governments to incur the necessary costs for practical implementation. Instead, 
the limited effect of societal preferences on the implementation of Internal 
Market directives supports ideas that citizens have few opportunities to 
influence policies dominated by business interests. In the case of JHA policy, 
societal preferences carry little weight given the observed low levels of 
voluntary participation in international human rights organizations. As 
discussed earlier, human rights organizations depend on donors and 
supporters signing petitions to further their causes. Therefore, citizens’ 
preferences may be much more relevant for other types of civic action than 
participation in voluntary organizations. 
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Figure 3 here 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, we analysed the link between two aspects of civil society strength 
(civic participation and CSO consultation) and EU policy implementation 
across different countries and policy areas. CSOs are expected to play an 
important role in the implementation process by monitoring implementation 
or mediating societal interests and policy-makers’ goals. Whereas the 
conceptualization of CSO strength varies in different strands of literature 
(Heinrich 2005; Foa and Ekiert 2016), there are few attempts to systematically 
analyse the effects of different dimensions of CSO strength on policy outcomes. 
To fill this gap, we examined the interaction between civic engagement (logic of 
membership) and the degree to which governments consult with CSOs during 
policy-making (logic of influence). Both the capacity of CSOs to mobilize their 
members and their ability to influence policies through government 
consultation are expected to facilitate policy implementation. The analyses 
show that civic participation contributes to policy implementation when state 
actors frequently include CSOs in the policymaking process. Conversely, if 
CSOs are denied access to the policymaking process, civic participation 
aggravates the implementation process. One possible explanation is that 
politically-engaged citizens turn against the implementation of EU policies 
when they feel they have little influence over the adopted policies. Our findings 
also show that frequent consultations with CSOs improve practical 
implementation, if civic participation is high. There are different explanations 
for this finding. High levels of participation could increase CSO awareness of 
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societal concerns and thus their ability to communicate potential 
implementation problems. Furthermore, governments are likely to be more 
responsive to the ideas of the relevant CSOs in countries and issue areas that 
attract high civic engagement.   
This study also shed some light on the conditions under which the two 
dimensions of civil society strength affect implementation outcomes across 
different countries and policy areas. Thus, we find that civic participation and 
CSO consultation do not influence practical implementation in low-capacity 
countries. This finding suggests a paradox between the expected role and the 
actual impact of civil society on policy outcomes, as strong civil society does not 
influence policy implementation in situations where it is needed to counteract 
weak bureaucratic institutions (Foley and Edwards 1996).  
Our findings also suggest that the impact of civic participation on policy 
implementation is conditioned on societal general support for EU policy in 
some issue areas. In particular, societal support for EU policy-making 
effectively mobilizes civic action in favour of policy implementation in Social 
policy directives, but not in other policy areas. Because these findings could be 
partially due to the limited number of observations available for the analysis of 
separate policy areas, future research should focus on the interaction between 
policy area characteristics and societal actors. Related to that, we were not able 
to capture policy-area differences in government consultation practices with 
CSOs. Future research should try to distinguish between individual CSOs in 
terms of their relations with domestic policy-makers and how such relations 
affect policy outcomes. More in-depth qualitative work could also help better 
capture the quality of CSO consultations and the extent to which governments 
are willing to listen to the views of non-state actors. Moreover, we should 
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acknowledge that civic participation and CSO consultation are not the only 
relevant aspects of civil society strength, but individual CSOs are often able to 
influence the implementation process through material resources and policy 
expertise. Unfortunately, information about individual CSO endowments is not 
available for a large number of countries and policy areas. Future research 
should try to shed more light on the interaction between various dimensions of 
civil society strength and policy outcomes.  
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Table 1: Analysis of civil society strength and practical compliance with EU 
directives 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5     
  
Civic participation -0.030 -0.258*** -0.160 -0.445*   -0.039  
[0.046] [0.054] [0.123] [0.221]    [0.613] 
CSO consultation 0.011 -0.245** -0.068 -0.450+   0.011  
[0.058] [0.083] [0.161] [0.271]    [0.057] 
Participation*Consultation 
 
0.125*** 0.091 0.202**     
[0.033] [0.063] [0.071]     
Societal support -0.642 -0.718 -1.861 -0.794    -0.655 
 [0.530] [0.518] [1.155] [0.628]    [0.821] 
Participation*Soc. Support     0.006 
     [0.403] 
Legal compliance 1.335*** 1.378*** 1.180** 1.368**  1.335***  
[0.354] [0.349] [0.442] [0.429]    [0.349] 
State capacity 0.222 0.222   0.223  
[0.156] [0.157]   [0.164] 
Western state -0.021 -0.006 -0.139 0.248    -0.022  
[0.171] [0.170] [0.191] [0.251]    [0.180] 
Ministerial support -0.047 -0.080 0.015 -0.101    -0.047  
[0.058] [0.062] [0.100] [0.085]    [0.056] 
Number of ministers -0.223*** -0.230*** -0.297*** -0.175*   -0.223***  
[0.058] [0.059] [0.081] [0.082]    [0.059] 
Policy discretion 3.578* 3.495* 3.424* 2.968+   3.579*  
[1.758] [1.708] [1.657] [1.674]    [1.799] 
Policy sectors 
  
   
Internal Market  -1.587+ -1.570+ -2.409** -1.206 -1.587+  
[0.896] [0.893] [0.868] [1.050]    [0.897] 
Justice & Home Affairs -1.390+ -1.420* -1.494* -1.390+   -1.389*  
[0.712] [0.706] [0.701] [0.709]    [0.695] 
Social Policy -1.300*** -1.417*** -2.532*** -1.104*** -1.300***  
[0.316] [0.312] [0.427] [0.295]    [0.315] 
Report characteristics 
  
   
Rule-specific -1.769** -1.768** -1.399* -1.960*   -1.770**  
[0.670] [0.660] [0.577] [0.767]    [0.676] 
Evaluation period -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004* -0.0001   -0.0002  
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]    [0.0002] 
Number of pages 0.017 0.020 0.048+ 0.008   0.017  
[0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.033]    [0.032] 
Constant 3.638*** 4.384*** 6.110** 5.248*** 3.659*  
[1.069] [1.034] [2.157] [1.241]    [1.608] 
Observations 409 409 160 249 409 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, clustered in Directives;   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure 1: Distribution of civic participation across policy areas (left) and mean 
of civic participation compared to mean of CSO consultation across member 
states (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted coefficients of CSO consultation and civic participation 
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Figure 3: Predicted coefficients of CSO consultation and civic participation 
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